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We propose several econometric measures of systemic risk to capture the interconnectedness among
the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance companies based on principal
components analysis and Granger-causality tests. We find that all four sectors have become highly
interrelated over the past decade, increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance
industries. These measures can also identify and quantify financial crisis periods, and seem to contain
predictive power for the current financial crisis.  Our results suggest that hedge funds can provide
early indications of market dislocation, and systemic risk arises from a complex and dynamic network
of relationships among hedge funds, banks, insurance companies, and brokers.
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References 471 Introduction
The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 has created renewed interest in systemic risk, a concept
originally intended to describe bank runs and currency crises, but which now applies to
any broad-based breakdown in the ﬁnancial system. Systemic risk can be deﬁned as the
probability that a series of correlated defaults among ﬁnancial institutions, occurring over
a short time span, will trigger a withdrawal of liquidity and widespread loss of conﬁdence
in the ﬁnancial system as a whole. The events of 2007–2009 have demonstrated that panic
and runs can extend to non-bank entities such as money market funds, insurance companies,
hedge funds, government-sponsored enterprises, and broker/dealers. Therefore, a precursor
to regulatory reform should be the development of formal measures of systemic risk, measures
that capture the linkages and vulnerabilities of the entire ﬁnancial system—not just those
of the banking industry. Such measures should be designed to facilitate the monitoring and
regulation of the overall level of risk to the system.
In this paper, we propose several econometric measures of systemic risk in the ﬁnance and
insurance sectors based on the statistical properties of the market returns of hedge funds,
banks, brokers, and insurance companies. While the recent ﬁnancial crisis has illustrated
the potential linkages among these four sectors, previous empirical studies have focused
only on one or two of them in isolation. Our measures are based on principal components
analysis and Granger-causality tests, and motivated by the events that created so much
market dislocation in August 1998 and 2007–2009.
For banks, brokers, and insurance companies, we conﬁne our attention to publicly listed
entities and use their monthly equity returns in our analysis. For hedge funds—which are
private partnerships—we use their monthly reported net-of-fee fund returns. Our empha-
sis on market returns is motivated by the desire to incorporate the most current informa-
tion in our systemic risk measures. Market returns reﬂect information more rapidly than
non-market-based measures such as accounting variables. We consider asset- and market-
capitalization-weighted return indexes of these four sectors, as well as the individual returns
of the 25 largest entities in each sector. While smaller institutions can also contribute to
systemic risk,1 such risks should be most readily observed in the largest entities. We be-
1For example, in a recent study commissioned by the G-20, the IMF (2009) determined that systemically
important institutions are not limited to those that are the largest, but also include others that are highly
interconnected and that can impair the normal functioning of ﬁnancial markets when they fail.
1lieve our study is the ﬁrst to capture the network of causal relationships between the largest
ﬁnancial institutions in these four sectors.
The likelihood of a major dislocation depends on the degree of correlation among the
holdings of ﬁnancial institutions, how sensitive they are to changes in market prices and
economic conditions (and the directionality, if any, of those sensitivities, i.e., causality), how
concentrated the risks are among those ﬁnancial institutions, and how closely connected those
institutions are with each other and the rest of the economy. The theoretical underpinnings
and institutional mechanisms by which these measures combine to produce systemic risk
have become clearer.2
Currently, direct information concerning the leverage of and linkages among these ﬁnan-
cial institutions is largely proprietary and unavailable to any single regulator. Nevertheless,
statistical relationships can yield valuable indirect information about the build-up of sys-
temic risk. Moreover, even if regulatory reforms eventually require systemically important
entities to provide such information to regulators, the forward-looking nature of equity mar-
kets and the dynamics of the hedge-fund industry suggest that an econometric approach may
still provide more immediate and actionable measures of systemic risk.
Our focus on hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance companies is not random, but
motivated by the extensive business ties between them, many of which have emerged only
in the last decade. For example, insurance companies have had little to do with hedge funds
until recently. However, as they moved more aggressively into non-core activities such as
insuring ﬁnancial products, credit-default swaps, derivatives trading, and investment man-
agement, insurers created new business units that competed directly with banks, hedge funds,
and broker/dealers. These activities have potential implications for systemic risk when con-
ducted on a large scale (see Geneva Association, 2010). Similarly, the banking industry
has been transformed over the last 10 years, not only with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act in 1999, but also through ﬁnancial innovations like securitization that have blurred
the distinction between loans, bank deposits, securities, and trading strategies. The types
of business relationships between these sectors have also changed, with banks and insurers
providing credit to hedge funds but also competing against them through their own propri-
etary trading desks, and hedge funds using insurers to provide principal protection on their
2See, for example Acharya and Richardson (2009), Allen and Gale (1994, 1998, 2000), Battiston et
al. (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gray (2009), Rajan (2006), Danielsson,
Shin, and Zigrand (2009), and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009).
2funds while simultaneously competing with them by oﬀering capital-market-intermediated
insurance such as catastrophe-linked bonds.
Our empirical ﬁndings show that liquidity and connectivity within and across all four
sectors are highly dynamic over the past decade, varying in quantiﬁable ways over time and
as a function of market conditions. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that over time, all four sectors have
become highly interrelated and less liquid, increasing the level of systemic risk in the ﬁnance
and insurance industries prior to crisis periods. These patterns are all the more striking in
light of the fact that our analysis is based on monthly returns data. In a framework where
all markets clear and past information is fully impounded into current prices, we should not
be able to detect signiﬁcant statistical relationships on a monthly timescale.
Moreover, our principal components estimates and Granger-causality tests point to an
important asymmetry in the connections: the returns of banks and insurers seem to have
more signiﬁcant impact on the returns of hedge funds and brokers than vice versa. We also
ﬁnd that this asymmetry became highly signiﬁcant prior to the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009,
indicating that our measures may be useful as early warning indicators of systemic risk. This
pattern suggests that banks may be more central to systemic risk than the so-called “shadow
banking system” (the non-bank ﬁnancial institutions that engage in banking functions). By
competing with other ﬁnancial institutions in non-traditional businesses, banks and insurers
may have taken on risks more appropriate for hedge funds, leading to the emergence of a
“shadow hedge-fund system” in which systemic risks could not be managed by traditional
regulatory instruments. Another possible interpretation is that, because they are more
highly regulated, banks and insurers are more sensitive to Value-at-Risk changes through
their capital requirements (Basel II and Solvency II), hence their behavior may generate
endogenous feedback loops with perverse spillover eﬀects to other ﬁnancial institutions.
In Section 2 we provide a brief review of the literature on systemic risk measurement, and
describe our proposed measures in Section 3. The data used in our analysis is summarized
in Section 4, and the empirical results and robustness checks are reported in Sections 5 and
6, respectively. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Literature Review
De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), who undertook a thorough survey of the systemic risk
literature, provide the following deﬁnitions for systemic risk and crises:
3A systemic crisis can be deﬁned as a systemic event that aﬀects a considerable
number of ﬁnancial institutions or markets in a strong sense, thereby severely im-
pairing the general well-functioning of the ﬁnancial system. While the “special”
character of banks plays a major role, we stress that systemic risk goes beyond
the traditional view of single banks’ vulnerability to depositor runs. At the heart
of the concept is the notion of “contagion”, a particularly strong propagation of
failures from one institution, market or system to another.
In a recent paper, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) describe requirements for a systemic risk
measure: “A systemic risk measure should identify the risk on the system by individually
systemic institutions, which are so interconnected and large that they can cause negative risk
spillover eﬀects on others, as well as by institutions which are systemic as part of a herd.”
In this paper we use these deﬁnitions to analyze systemic risk. Our analysis concentrates
on the interconnectedness of all major ﬁnancial institutions: banks, brokers, insurance com-
panies, and hedge funds. Allen (2001) underlined the importance of mapping out relation-
ships between ﬁnancial institutions when studying ﬁnancial fragility and systemic risk. The
theoretical framework underlying our analysis refers to interlinkages among ﬁnancial insti-
tutions that could spread both through negative externalities or fundamental shocks, as well
as liquidity, volatility spirals, or network eﬀects. The channels though which these spirals
can spreads are many and well described in the literature, beginning with Bhattacharya and
Gale (1987), Allen and Gale (1998, 2000), Diamond and Rajan (2005), and more recently by
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Danielsson and Zigrand (2008),
Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2009), Battiston et al. (2009), and Castiglionesi, Periozzi,
and Lorenzoni (2009) among others.
The empirical literature on systemic risk can be loosely divided into three groups. The
ﬁrst group involves bank contagion, and is mostly based on the autocorrelation of the number
of bank defaults, bank returns, and fund withdrawals, as well as exposures among operating
banks in which a default by one bank would render other banks insolvent (examples of these
studies are cited in De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). More recently, Lehar (2005) estimated
correlations between bank-asset portfolios and used default probabilities of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions as a measure of systemic risk. Jorion (2005) analyzed similarities in bank trading
risk, and Bartram, Brown, and Hund (2007) used cumulative negative abnormal returns,
maximum-likelihood estimation of bank failure probabilities implied by equity prices, and
4estimates of systemic risk implied by equity option prices to measure the probability of
systemic failure.
In the wake of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2007, the Bank of England study (Aikman
et al., 2009) investigated funding-liquidity risk by integrating balance-sheet-based models of
credit and market risk with a network model to evaluate the probability of bank default.
Huang, Zhou, and Zhou (2009) proposed a measure of systemic risk based on the price
of insuring twelve major U.S. banks against ﬁnancial distress using ex-ante bank default
probabilities and forecasted asset-return correlations.
The second group of empirical studies of systemic risk involves banking crises, aggregate
ﬂuctuations, and lending booms. These studies focus on bank capital ratios and bank li-
abilities, and show that aggregate variables such as macroeconomic fundamentals contain
signiﬁcant predictive power, providing evidence in favor of the macro perspective on sys-
temic risk in the banking sector (Gorton, 1988; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu, and
Billings, 1997; and Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999). In a more recent study, Bhansali, Gingrich
and Longstaﬀ (2008) used the prices of indexed credit derivatives to extract market expec-
tations about the nature and magnitude of credit risk in ﬁnancial markets. The authors
extracted the “systemic credit risk” component from index credit derivatives. They found
that systemic risk during the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis is double that of the May 2005 GM
credit-downgrade event. De Nicol´ o and Lucchetta (2009) investigated the impact and trans-
mission of structurally identiﬁable shocks within and between the macroeconomy, ﬁnancial
markets, and intermediaries, as well as their “tail” realizations.
The third group of studies in the empirical systemic risk literature focuses on contagion,
spillover eﬀects, and joint crashes in ﬁnancial markets. These studies are based on sim-
ple correlation, correlation derived from ARCH models, extreme dependence of securities
market returns, and securities market co-movements not explained by fundamentals. They
involve mainly currency and ﬁnancial crises observed in the second half of the 1980’s and
1990’s. Examples include Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, 2000), who used a simple vector
autoregression model to run Granger-causality tests between the interest and exchange rates
of ﬁve Asian economies before and after the Asian crisis. The authors did not detect any
Granger-causal relations before the Asian crisis, but many were detected during and after
the crisis. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) proposed a measure of correlation to correct for the
bias stemming from changes in volatility in contagion detection, and applied this measure
5to the Asian Crisis.
The ﬁrst study of extreme dependence was conducted by Mandelbrot (1963), and sub-
sequently revisited by Jansen and de Vries (1991) and Longin (1996) to measure the tail
behavior (booms and crashes) of stock market returns. Longin and Solnik (2001) use ex-
treme value theory to show that the correlation of large negative returns is much larger
than the correlation of positive returns. Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) introduced a new
approach to evaluate contagion in ﬁnancial markets based on the coincidence of extreme-
return shocks across countries within a region and across regions. Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz
(2009) used quantile regression and logit models to analyze co-movement among hedge-
fund strategies, and found strong evidence of contagion among these hedge-fund strategies.
Quantile regression methods have also been used by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) in their
CoVaR measure of systemic risk. Recently, a set of measures based on rare and unknown
outcomes and information entropy has been proposed by Duggey (2009). Gray and Jobst
(2010) proposed measuring systemic risk via contingent claims analysis. Kritzman, Li, Page,
and Rigobon (2010) introduced a systemic risk measure called the absorption ratio based on
principal components analysis. And Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010)
have proposed “systemic expected shortfall” (SES) as a measure of a ﬁnancial institution’s
propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized, which can
be used to measure each ﬁnancial institution’s contribution to systemic crisis.
Our approach—to measure the degree of connectivity among ﬁnancial institutions and
how the risk proﬁles of these institutions can generate systemic risk—is complementary to
these studies. In particular, motivated by De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), Brunnermeier
et al. (2009) among others, we take a broader perspective by deﬁning the system of major
players as hedge funds, brokers, banks, and insurers. For example, Chan et al. (2006) found
that funding relationships between hedge funds and large banks that have brokerage divisions
contribute to systemic risk. Fung and Hsieh (2002, 2004) and Chan et al. (2006) showed that
hedge-fund returns are nonlinearly related to equity market risk, credit risk, interest rate
risk, exchange rate risk, and option-based factors. Brunnermeier (2009) argued that hedge
funds can be commonly aﬀected by ﬁnancial crises through many mechanisms: funding
liquidity, market liquidity, loss and margin spirals, runs on hedge funds, and aversion to
Knightian uncertainty. The importance of brokers and insurers have been underscored by the
current ﬁnancial crisis. In particular, the role of funding risk and the interconnectedness of
6brokers and hedge funds has been considered recently by King and Maier (2009), Aragon and
Strahan (2009), Brunnermeier and Petersen (2009), and Klaus and Rzepkowski (2009). The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) emphasized that the interconnectedness of
large ﬁnancial institutions transmitted negative shocks across the ﬁnancial system and the
economy in the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.
Our work is also related to Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2009) who investigated contagion
from lagged bank- and broker-returns to hedge-fund returns. We investigate these relation-
ships as well, but also consider the possibility of reverse contagion, i.e., causal eﬀects from
hedge funds to banks and brokers. Moreover, we add a fourth sector—insurance companies—
to the mix, which has become increasingly important, particularly during the most recent
ﬁnancial crisis.
Our analysis is also complementary to the CoVaR analysis of Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2009), in which four groups of ﬁnancial institutions—brokers, banks, real estate institutions,
and insurance companies—are analyzed using daily data. CoVaR is an alternate measure of
systemic risk that captures the value at risk (VaR) of ﬁnancial institutions conditional on
other institutions being in distress. We add to this line of inquiry by estimating causal rela-
tionships between ﬁnancial institutions and by also incorporating hedge funds, an important
sector of the ﬁnancial system.
Finally, our paper is complementary to Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson
(2010) who measure each bank’s contribution to systemic risk and suggest ways to limit it
through taxes and regulation. In contrast, our analysis is not meant to be directly applicable
to determining optimal bank capital requirements or taxation policy, but may serve instead
as early warning signals of potential market dislocation, and may also be used to detect
systemically important institutions and linkages.
3 Systemic Risk Measures
In this section we summarize our measures of systemic risk, which are designed to capture
changes in correlation and causality among ﬁnancial institutions. In Section 3.1, we propose
principal components analysis as a means of capturing increased correlation, and Section 3.2
contains a description of the Granger-causality tests we use to determine the directionality
of correlation.
73.1 Principal Components Analysis
Increased commonality among the asset returns of banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds
can be empirically detected by using principal components analysis (PCA) to decompose the
covariance matrix of the four index returns (see Muirhead, 1982 for an exposition of PCA).
If, for example, asset returns are driven by a linear K-factor model, the ﬁrst K principal
components should explain most of the time-series variation in returns. More formally, if
Rjt = αj + δ1F1t + ··· + δKFKt + ￿jt (1)
where E[￿jt￿j0t] = 0 for any j 6= j0, then the covariance matrix Σ of the vector of returns
Rt ≡ [ R1t ··· RJt ]0 can be expressed as
Var[Rt] ≡ Σ = QΘQ





θ1 0 ··· 0
0 θ2 0
. . . ... . . .






where Θ contains the eigenvalues of Σ along its diagonal and Q is the matrix of corre-
sponding eigenvectors. Since Σ is a covariance matrix, it is positive semideﬁnite hence all
the eigenvalues are nonnegative. When normalized to sum to one, each eigenvalue can be
interpreted as the fraction of the total variance of turnover attributable to the corresponding
principal component. If (1) holds, it can be shown that as the size N of the cross section
increases without bound, exactly K normalized eigenvalues of Σ approach positive ﬁnite
limits, and the remaining N −K eigenvalues approach 0 (see, for example, Chamberlain,
1983, and Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1983). Therefore, the plausibility of (1), and the
value of K, can be gauged by examining the magnitudes of the eigenvalues of Σ.
The only challenge is the fact that the covariance matrix Σ must be estimated, hence we






(Rt − R)(Rt − R)
0
is singular if the number of assets J in the cross section is larger than the number of time series
observations T. Therefore, we limit our attention to the index returns of banks, brokers,
8insurers, and hedge funds to maximize the number of degrees of freedom.3 By examining the
time variation in the magnitudes of the eigenvalues of index returns’ covariance matrix, we
may be able to detect increasing correlation among the four ﬁnancial sectors, i.e., increased
connections and integration as well as similarities in risk exposures, which can contribute to
systemic risk.
3.2 Granger Causality Tests
To investigate the dynamic propagation of systemic risk, it is important to measure not
only the degree of interconnectedness between ﬁnancial institutions, but also the direction
of the relationship. One econometric measure is Granger causality, a statistical notion of
causality based on forecast power. X is said to “Granger-cause” Y if past values of X contain
information that helps predict Y above and beyond the information contained in past values
of Y alone. The mathematical formulation of this test is based on linear regressions of Y on
X and X on Y , and its application to our framework is described in the Appendix.
In an informationally eﬃcient market, price changes should not be related to other lagged
variables, hence a Granger-causality test should not detect any causality. However, in pres-
ence of Value-at-Risk constraints or other market frictions such as transactions costs, borrow-
ing constraints, costs of gathering and processing information, and institutional restrictions
on shortsales, we may ﬁnd Granger causality among price changes of ﬁnancial assets. More-
over, this potential “forecastability” cannot easily be “arbitraged” away, precisely because of
the presence of these frictions. From this perspective, the degree of Granger causality in asset
returns can be viewed as a proxy for the spillover among market participants as suggested by
Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2009) and Battiston et al. (2009). As this eﬀect is ampliﬁed,
the tighter are the connections and integration among ﬁnancial institutions, heightening the
severity of systemic events as shown by Castiglionesi, Periozzi, and Lorenzoni (2009) and
Battiston et al. (2009).
The standard Granger-causality measure is linear, and cannot capture nonlinear and
higher-order causal relationships. This limitation is potentially relevant for our purposes
since we are interested in whether an increase in riskiness (e.g., volatility) in one ﬁnancial
3Singularity by itself does not pose any problems for the computation of eigenvalues—this follows from
the singular-value decomposition theorem—but it does have implications for the statistical properties of
estimated eigenvalues. For example, Lo and Wang (2000) report Monte Carlo evidence that the eigenvalues
of a singular estimator of a positive-deﬁnite covariance matrix can be severely biased.
9institution leads to an increase in the riskiness of another. To capture these higher-order
eﬀects, we also consider a second causality measure that we call “nonlinear Granger causal-
ity”, which is based on Markov-chain models of returns. This extension of linear Granger
causality can capture the eﬀect of one ﬁnancial institution’s return on the future mean and
variance of the returns of another ﬁnancial institution, which should be able to detect the
volatility-based interconnectedness hypothesized by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2009).
More formally, consider the case of hedge funds and banks, and let ZHt and ZBt be
Markov chains that characterize the expected returns and volatilities of the two indexes,
respectively, i.e.:
Rj,t = µ(Zj,t) + σ(Zj,t)uj,t (3)
where Rj,t is the excess return of index j in period t, j = H,B, uj,t is independently and
identically distributed (IID) over time, and Zj,t is a two-state Markov chain with transition
probability matrix Pz,j for index j.
We can test the nonlinear causal interdependence between these two series by testing the
following hypotheses (the general case of nonlinear Granger-causality estimation is considered
in the Appendix):
1. Causality from ZHt to ZBt
2. Causality from ZBt to ZHt
The joint process Yt ≡ (ZHt,ZBt) is itself a ﬁrst-order Markov chain with transition prob-
abilities:
P(Yt|Yt−1) = P(ZHt,ZBt |ZHt−1,ZBt−1) . (4)
where all the information from the past history of the process which is relevant for the
transition probabilities at time t is represented by the previous state of the process, i.e.
regimes at time t−1. Under the additional assumption that the transition probabilities do
not vary over time, the process can be deﬁned as a Markov chain with stationary transition
probabilities, summarized in the transition matrix P. We can then decompose the joint
10transition probabilities as:
P(Yt|Yt−1) = P(ZHt,ZBt |ZHt−1,ZBt−1) (5)
= P(ZBt |ZHt,ZHt−1,ZBt−1) × P(ZHt|ZHt−1,ZBt−1) . (6)
According to this decomposition and following Billio and Di Sanzo (2009) we run the follow-
ing two tests of nonlinear Granger causality:
1. Granger Non-Causality from ZHt to ZBt:
HZH;ZB (ZHt ; ZBt)
by decomposing the joint probability:
P(ZHt,ZBt|ZHt−1,ZBt−1) = P(ZHt|ZBt,ZHt−1,ZBt−1) ×
P(ZBt|ZHt−1,ZBt−1) . (7)
In this case, the last term becomes
P(ZBt|ZHt−1,ZBt−1) = P(ZBt |ZBt−1) .
2. Granger Non-Causality from ZBt to ZHt:
HZB;ZH (ZBt ; ZHt)
by requiring that ZBt−1 does not appear as a second term of the previous decomposi-
tion, thus
P(ZHt|ZHt−1,ZBt−1) = P(ZHt|ZHt−1) .
4 The Data
For the main analysis, we use monthly returns data for hedge funds, brokers, banks, and
insurers, described in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Summary statistics are provided
in Section 4.3.
114.1 Hedge Funds
Our hedge-fund data consists of aggregate hedge-fund index returns from the CS/Tremont
database from January 1994 to December 2008, which are asset-weighted indexes of funds
with a minimum of $10 million in assets under management, a minimum one-year track
record, and current audited ﬁnancial statements. The following strategies are included
in the total aggregate index (hereafter, known as “Hedge Funds”): Dedicated Short Bias,
Long/Short Equity, Emerging Markets, Distressed, Event Driven, Equity Market Neutral,
Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Multi-Strategy, and Managed Fu-
tures. The strategy indexes are computed and rebalanced monthly and the universe of funds
is redeﬁned on a quarterly basis. We use net-of-fee monthly excess returns. This database
accounts for survivorship bias in hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh, 2000).
We also use individual hedge-fund data from the TASS Tremont database. Funds in the
TASS Tremont database are similar to the ones used in the CS/Tremont indexes, however,
TASS Tremont does not implement any restrictions on size, track record, or the presence of
audited ﬁnancial statements. Therefore, the TASS Tremont database contains more funds—
a total of 8,770 hedge funds in both Live and Defunct databases—than its corresponding
index.
4.2 Banks, Brokers, and Insurers
Data for individual brokers is obtained from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research
in Security Prices Database, from which we select the monthly returns of all companies with
SIC Codes from 6200 to 6299 and construct our value-weighted broker index (hereafter,
called “Brokers”). Indexes for “Banks” and “Insurers” are constructed similarly using SIC
codes 6000–6199 for banks and 6300–6499 for insurers.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the sample size, annualized mean, annualized standard deviation, minimum,
maximum, median, skewness, kurtosis, ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬃcients ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3,
and corresponding p-values for our dataset. Brokers have the highest annual mean of 14.22%
and the highest standard deviation of 29.05%. Insurers have the lowest mean, 7.90%, but a
relatively high standard deviation of 17.84%. Hedge Funds have the highest autocorrelation
of 0.22, which is particularly striking when compared to those of Banks (0.02), Insurers
12(0.08), and Brokers (0.13). This ﬁnding is consistent with the hedge-fund industry’s higher
exposure to illiquid assets and return-smoothing (see Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004).
Statistic
Hedge 
Funds Brokers Banks Insurers S&P500
Sample Size 180 180 180 180 180
Ann. Mean (%) 8.72     14.22     10.12     7.90     8.59    
Ann. SD (%) 7.96     29.05     19.37     17.84     15.17    
Min (%) -7.55     -31.56     -22.38     -24.09     -16.64    
Max (%) 8.53     26.75     14.26     23.67     9.84    
Median (%) 0.79     1.64     1.40     0.97     1.26    
Skewness -0.17     -0.41     -0.94     -0.47     -0.75    
Kurtosis 5.26     3.99     5.64     7.56     4.27    
r r r r1 0.22     0.13     0.02     0.08     0.10    
p-value(r r r r1) 0.00     0.07     0.80     0.30     0.17    
r r r r2 0.11     -0.09     -0.01     0.02     -0.01    
p-value(r2 r2 r2 r2) 0.13     0.22     0.88     0.80     0.90    
r r r r3 0.04     0.03     -0.01     -0.05     0.07    
p-value(r3 r3 r3 r3) 0.61     0.73     0.93     0.54     0.35    
Table 1: Summary statistics for monthly CS/Tremont Hedge Fund index returns, value-
weighted return indexes for Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and S&P 500 returns from January
1994 to December 2008.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we implement the measures deﬁned in Section 3 using historical data for index
returns corresponding to the four sectors of the ﬁnance and insurance industries described in
Section 4. Section 5.1 contains the results of principal components analysis applied to the re-
turn indexes, and Section 5.2 reports the outcomes of linear and nonlinear Granger-causality
tests. To better understand the implications of these Granger-causality relationships, in Sec-
tion 5.3 we present results for individual ﬁnancial institutions and simple visualizations via
network diagrams. And in Section 5.4, we evaluate the predictive power of Granger causality
relationships.
5.1 Principal Components Analysis
Since the heart of systemic risk is commonality among multiple institutions, we attempt to
measure commonality through Principal Components Analysis (PCA) applied to the collec-
tion of indexes we constructed in Section 4 over the whole sample period, 1994–2008. The
13time-series results for eigenvalues and eigenvector exposures are presented in Figures 1 and
2.
In addition, we tabulate eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the principal components
analysis over two time periods: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. The results in Table 2 show
that the ﬁrst principal component captures 77% of variability among ﬁnancial institutions in
1994–2000, which increases to 83% in 2001–2008. Together, the ﬁrst and second components
explain 92% of the return variation on average. The time-series graph of eigenvalues for
all four principal components presented in Figure 1 shows that indeed the ﬁrst and second
principal components capture the majority of return variation during the whole sample.
However, the ﬁrst principal component is very dynamic capturing from 65% to 93% of
return variation. The PC1 eigenvalue was increasing from the beginning of the sample,
peaking at 93% in August 1998 during the LTCM crisis, and subsequently decreased. The
PC1 eigenvalue started to increase in 2003 and stayed high through 2005 (the period when
the Federal Reserve intervened and raised interest rates), declining slightly in 2006–2007, and
increasing again in 2008, peaking in March 2008. As a result, the ﬁrst principal component























































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Principal components analysis of the monthly return indexes for Banks, Brokers,
Insurers, and Hedge Funds over January 1994 to December 2008. 36-month rolling-window





















































































































































































Principal Component 1 Factor Loadings





















































































































































































Principal Components 1 and 2 Factor Loadings
Hedge Funds Brokers Banks Insurers
Figure 2: Principal components analysis of the monthly return indexes for Banks, Brokers,
Insurers, and Hedge Funds over January 1994 to December 2008. 36-month rolling-window
eigenvector exposures for principal component 1 and the sum of principal components 1 and
2 are presented.
15Sample Period PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
1994 to 2000 77% 16% 4% 3%
2001 to 2008 83% 10% 6% 1%
1994 to 2000 61% 24% 9% 5%
2001 to 2008 69% 19% 10% 3%
Index PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
Hedge Funds 0.13    -0.18    0.84    0.50   
Brokers 0.79    -0.57    -0.23    -0.02   
Banks 0.45    0.49    0.41    -0.63   
Insurers 0.40    0.64    -0.28    0.60   
Hedge Funds 0.10    -0.08    -0.22    0.97   
Brokers 0.76    -0.64    0.02    -0.13   
Banks 0.50    0.58    0.63    0.14   





Hedge Funds, Brokers, Banks, Insurers
Hedge-Fund Sectors
Table 2: Principal components analysis of the monthly return indexes for ﬁnancial institu-
tions (Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds) over two time periods: January 1994 to
December 2000, and January 2001 to December 2008.
16Table 2 contains factor loadings for 1994–2000 and 2001–2008 and Figure 2 depicts 36-
month rolling-window eigenvector exposures for PC1 and the sum of PC1 and PC2 for the
whole sample, 1994–2008. The loadings on the ﬁrst two principal components are quite
persistent over time for all indexes. All loadings are signiﬁcant at 5%, but we do ﬁnd
variation in the sensitivities of the indexes to the four principal components. For example,
at 0.77, the sensitivity of the Broker returns to the ﬁrst component is the largest on average,
compared to only 0.12 for Hedge Funds. The sensitivity of Banks and Insurers to the ﬁrst
principal component is 0.47 and 0.40 on average, respectively.4 Hedge Funds seem to be
quite independent of other ﬁnancial institutions, with signiﬁcant factor loadings on the third
component (0.84 in 1994–2000) and on the fourth component (0.97 in 2001–2008). The
exposures of Brokers, Banks, and Insurers to the third and fourth principal components are
small. The third and fourth principal components explain only 4% and 3% of the total
variation, respectively. Figure 2 also shows that during the whole sample the exposures of
Hedge Funds to the ﬁrst and second principal components were minimal, averaging only 7%
of the total exposure. As a result, Hedge Funds do not contribute greatly to the covariance
matrix of the four index returns. In summary, the ﬁrst and second principal components
aﬀect mostly Brokers, Banks, and Insurers, not Hedge Funds.5
The eigenvector of the second principal component (PC2) captures two distinct groups of
ﬁnancial institutions: Group 1 (Hedge Funds and Brokers that have negative factor loadings
on PC2) and Group 2 (Banks and Insurers that have positive factor loadings on PC2). The
groupings are plausible given the various business relationships and similarities among these
institutions.
5.2 Granger Causality Tests
In Table 3 we present p-values for linear Granger causality tests between months t and t+1
among the monthly return indexes of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, Hedge Funds, and the S&P
500 for two samples: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. The causality relationships for these two
4These averages are calculated by averaging principal components for the 1994–2000 and 2001–2008
periods.
5We also re-run the PCA analysis by scaling eigenvectors by each ﬁnancial institution’s volatility. Given
the relatively low volatility of Hedge Funds (Table 1), once this adjustment is made, the exposures of Hedge
Funds to the ﬁrst and second principal components were in line with those of other ﬁnancial institutions.
Speciﬁcally, each ﬁnancial institution contributed about 0.25 to the total exposure. The loadings are also
persistent over time. The results are available from the authors upon request.
17samples are depicted in Figure 3. Relationships that are signiﬁcant at 5% level are captured
with arrows. Black arrows represent uni-directional causal relationships, and red arrows
represent bi-directional causal relationships. All linear Granger-causality tests are adjusted













































































Hedge Funds 84.0 31.4 69.4 51.1 24.1 50.5 19.8 65.2
Brokers 50.2 40.0 89.5 19.5 0.0 8.0 0.9 19.9
Banks 48.6 87.2 88.3 31.7 0.0 25.3 8.5 35.1
Insurers 26.5 44.9 5.2 85.0 0.0 0.1 3.1 4.0
S&P 500 66.1 89.0 55.2 69.1 0.0 1.9 6.2 1.2
Hedge Funds 24.5 43.2 53.6 NA 99.2 76.3 80.1 NA
Brokers 28.7 33.9 48.2 NA 36.4 97.5 21.6 NA
Banks 17.5 39.7 24.0 NA 4.7 54.2 97.0 NA
Insurers 27.8 91.1 87.1 NA 40.1 6.3 73.8 NA
S&P 500 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2001 to 2008 1994 to 2000
Raw Returns
Residual Returns
1994 to 2000 2001 to 2008
Table 3: p-values of linear Granger-causality test statistics for the monthly returns and
monthly residual returns (from regressions on the monthly returns of the S&P 500) of Hedge
Funds, Brokers, Banks, and Insurers over two samples: January 1994 to December 2000,
and January 2001 to December 2008. Statistics that are signiﬁcant at 5% level are shown in
bold, and p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
We do not observe any signiﬁcant causal relationships between Banks, Brokers, Insurers,
and Hedge Funds in the ﬁrst part of the sample (1994–2000). However, in the second half of
the sample (2001–2008) we ﬁnd that all ﬁnancial institutions became highly linked. Hedge
Funds were causally aﬀected by Banks, Brokers, and Insurers, though, they did not aﬀect
any other ﬁnancial institutions. Moreover, bi-directional relationships between Brokers and
Insurers emerged. Banks were only aﬀected by Insurers. Therefore, in stark contrast to
1994–2000, all four sectors of the ﬁnance and insurance industry became connected in 2001–
2008. In 1994–2000 we ﬁnd that none of the ﬁnancial institutions had any forecast power
for future changes in S&P 500 returns, but in 2001–2008, Insurers Granger-caused S&P 500
returns.










(a)  1994 – 2000 (b)  2001 – 2008
Figure 3: Linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of statistical signiﬁcance)
among the monthly returns of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds over two samples:
(a) January 1994 to December 2000, and (b) January 2001 to December 2008. All p-values
are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
and operate in diﬀerent markets. However, all these ﬁnancial institutions rely on leverage,
which may be innocuous from each institution’s perspective, but from a broader perspective,
diversiﬁcation may be reduced and systemic risk increased. The linear Granger-causality
tests show that a liquidity shock to one sector propagates to other sectors, eventually cul-
minating in losses, defaults, and a systemic event. This possibility will become clearer when
we turn to the Granger-causality network map of individual ﬁnancial institutions in Section
5.3.
We also investigate dynamic causality among the return indexes of Banks, Brokers, In-
surers, and Hedge Funds using a 36-month rolling window. The results are presented in
Figure 4. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the proportion of signiﬁcant causal relationships at 1%,
5%, and 10% signiﬁcance levels out of the total possible causal relationships (12 for 4 in-
dexes) and graph this fraction over time. We ﬁnd Granger causality is generally present in
the second part of the sample (after 2001). This is in line with our original methodology of
splitting the total time periods into two samples: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. The presence
of signiﬁcant causal relationships can be attributed to the existence of frictions in the ﬁnan-
cial and insurance system. As discussed above, Value-at-Risk constraints and other market
frictions such as transaction costs, borrowing constraints, costs of gathering and process-
19ing information, and institutional restrictions on shortsales may lead to Granger causality
among price changes of ﬁnancial assets. Speciﬁcally, after the LTCM crisis and the Internet
Crash of 2000, the ﬁnancial system started to exhibit these frictions. Figure 4 also depicts
the presence of Granger causality to Hedge Funds over time at the 5% level of signiﬁcance.
Consistent with results found in Table 3 and depicted in Figure 3, Hedge Funds are largely
causally aﬀected by other ﬁnancial institutions starting in 2001. The exception is the period
associated with the failure of the Amaranth hedge fund in 2006.
These results are also surprising since we are using heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-
adjusted test statistics for the monthly returns of aggregate indexes. In a framework where
all markets clear and past information is reﬂected in current prices, returns should not exhibit
any systemic time-series patterns. However, our results are consistent with Danielsson et
al. (2009) who show that risk-neutral traders operating under Value-at-Risk constraints can
amplify market shocks through feedback eﬀects. Our results are also consistent with Battis-
ton et al. (2009) who generate the endogenous emergence of systemic risk in a credit network
among ﬁnancial institutions. Individual ﬁnancial fragility feeds back on itself, amplifying the
initial shock and leading to systemic crisis.
Our systemic risk measure is based on causal interconnectedness between ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, which captures both contagion eﬀects between ﬁnancial institutions as well as
exposures among all ﬁnancial institutions to a common factor, e.g., the U.S. equity market.
To separate contagion eﬀects and common-factor exposure, we re-estimate Granger-causality
relationships using the residuals of the four index returns from regressions against the S&P
500. While this procedure should eliminate the single largest common factor from the four
indexes, it may also eliminate some of the genuine connections among ﬁnancial institu-
tions because the ﬁnancial sector represents about 23% of the S&P 500 capitalization (until
2006) and because the “ﬁnancial market” is not a passive actor, but contributes to endoge-
nous feedbacks among ﬁnancial institutions. Therefore, the results for the residuals may be
viewed as a conservative upper bound on the impact of the common factor in determining
Granger-causal relationships among the four indexes.
Table 3 presents the p-values of linear Granger causality test statistics for the monthly
residual returns of Hedge Funds, Brokers, Banks, and Insurers over the same two samples:
1994–2000 and 2001–2008. The results for these two sub-samples are depicted in Figure 5.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1do not ﬁnd any causality among Brokers, Banks, Hedge Funds, and Insurers. In the second
part of the sample (2001–2008), we ﬁnd that after adjusting for the S&P 500, shocks to
Banks propagate to Hedge Funds and the Insurers aﬀect Brokers; however, shocks to other
ﬁnancial institutions do not aﬀect Banks and Insurers. In this respect, Banks and Insurers










(a)  1994 – 2000 (b)  2001 – 2008
Figure 5: Linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of statistical signiﬁcance)
among the residual returns (from a market-model regression against the S&P 500) of Banks,
Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds over two samples: (a) January 1994 to December 2000,
and (b) January 2001 to December 2008. All p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity.
Table 4 presents p-values of nonlinear Granger causality likelihood ratio tests (see Section
3.2) for the monthly residual returns indexes of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and the four hedge-
fund indexes over the two samples: 1994–2000 and 2001–2008. This analysis shows that
causal relationships are even stronger if we take into account both the level of the mean and
the level of risk that these ﬁnancial institutions may face, i.e., their volatilities. The presence
of strong nonlinear Granger-causality relationships is detected in both samples. Moreover,
in the 2001–2008 sample, we ﬁnd that almost all ﬁnancial institutions were aﬀected by the
past level of risk of other ﬁnancial institutions.7
Note that linear Granger-causality tests provide causality relationships based only on the
means, whereas nonlinear Granger-causality tests also take into account the linkages among
6The p-value for the Granger-causal link from Insurers to Brokers is 6.3%.































































Hedge Funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 8.8
Brokers 0.0 23.7 74.9 0.0 0.0 94.2
Banks 1.7 0.0 78.1 21.4 0.7 0.0
Insurers 6.7 82.0 93.1 36.6 0.2 0.0
1994 to 2008 2001 to 2008
Table 4: p-values of nonlinear Granger-causality likelihood ratio tests for the monthly resid-
ual returns indexes of Banks, Brokers, Insurers, and Hedge Funds for two sub-samples:
January 1994 to December 2000, and January 2001 to December 2008. Statistics that are
signiﬁcant at 5% level are shown in bold. All p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity.
the volatilities of ﬁnancial institutions. With nonlinear Granger-causality tests we ﬁnd more
interconnectedness between ﬁnancial institutions compared to linear Granger-causality re-
sults, which supports the endogenous volatility feedback relationship proposed by Danielsson,
Shin, and Zigrand (2009). The nonlinear Granger-causality results are also consistent with
the results of the linear Granger-causality tests in two respects: the connections are increas-
ing over time, and even after controlling for the S&P 500, shocks to one ﬁnancial institution
are likely to spread to all other ﬁnancial institutions.
5.3 Network Diagrams
To fully appreciate the impact of Granger-causal relationships among various ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, we provide a visualization of the results of linear Granger-causality tests applied
over 36-month rolling sub-periods to the 25 largest institutions (as determined by average
AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks
during the time period considered) in each of the four index categories.8
The composition of this sample of 100 ﬁnancial institutions changes over time as assets
under management change, and as ﬁnancial institutions are added or deleted from the sample.
Granger-causality relationships are drawn as straight lines connecting two institutions, with
the color representing the type of institution that is “causing” the relationship, i.e., the
8Given that hedge-fund returns are only available monthly, we impose a minimum of 36 months to obtain
reliable estimates of Granger-causal relationships. We also used a rolling window of 60 months to control
the robustness of the results. Results are provided upon request.
23institution at date-t which Granger-causes the returns of another institution at date t+1.
Green indicates a broker, red indicates a hedge fund, black indicates an insurer, and blue
indicates a bank. Only those relationships signiﬁcant at 5% level are depicted. The time-
series of the number of connections as a % of all possible connections is depicted in Figure 6.
According to Figure 6, the number of connections are large and signiﬁcant during the LTCM
1998 crisis, 2002–2004 (period of low interest rates and high leverage in ﬁnancial institutions),
and the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.9 To conserve space, we tabulate results only for
ﬁve of the 36-month rolling-window 145 sub-periods in Figures 7–11: 1994–1996, 1996–1998,
1999–2001, 2002–2004, and 2006–2008. These are representative time-periods encompassing
both tranquil, boom, and bust periods in the sample as shown in Figure 6.10
For each sub-period, we also provide summary statistics for the monthly returns of 100
largest (with respect to AUM) ﬁnancial institutions in Table 5, including the asset-weighted
autocorrelation, the normalized number of connections,11 and the total number of connec-
tions.
We ﬁnd that Granger-causality relationships are highly dynamic among these ﬁnancial
institutions. Results are presented in Table 5 and Figures 7–11. For example, the total
number of connections between ﬁnancial institutions was 583 in the beginning of the sample
(1994–1996), but it more than doubled to 1,244 at the end of the sample (2006–2008). We
also ﬁnd that during and before ﬁnancial crises the ﬁnancial system becomes much more
interconnected in comparison to more tranquil periods. For example, the ﬁnancial system
was highly interconnected during the LTCM 1998 crisis and the most recent Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009. In the relatively tranquil period of 1994–1996, the total number of connec-
tions as a percentage of all possible connections was 6% and the total number of connections
among ﬁnancial institutions was 583. Right before and during the LTCM 1998 crisis (1996–
1998), the number of connections increased by 50% to 856 encompassing 9% of all possible
connections. In 2002–2004, the total number of connections was just 611 (6% of total pos-
sible connections), and that more than doubled to 1244 connections (13% of total possible
9More detailed analysis of the signiﬁcance of Granger-causal relationships is provided in the robustness
analysis of Section 6.1.
10To fully appreciate the dynamic nature of these connections, we have created a short animation using
36-month rolling-window network diagrams updated every month from January 1994 to December 2008,
which can be viewed at http://web.mit.edu/alo/www.
11The normalized number of connections is the fraction of all statistically signiﬁcant connections (at the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hedge Funds 0.03 7% 3% 6% 6% 41     21     36     37     
Brokers -0.15 3% 5% 6% 4% 18     29     36     24     
Banks -0.03 6% 7% 9% 7% 40     46     54     44     
Insurers -0.10 5% 6% 6% 9% 33     38     35     51     
All -0.03
Hedge Funds 0.08 14% 6% 5% 3% 82     38     30     20     
Brokers -0.04 13% 9% 9% 9% 81     53     54     57     
Banks -0.09 11% 8% 11% 10% 71     52     65     64     
Insurers 0.02 9% 9% 7% 6% 57     54     44     34     
All -0.09
Hedge Funds 0.17 5% 5% 5% 9% 32     32     33     58     
Brokers 0.03 8% 9% 3% 5% 53     52     19     29     
Banks -0.09 5% 3% 4% 7% 30     17     25     42     
Insurers -0.20 5% 3% 2% 6% 32     16     14     36     
All -0.08
Hedge Funds 0.20 10% 3% 9% 5% 61     20     56     29     
Brokers -0.09 8% 4% 4% 6% 53     23     26     39     
Banks -0.14 9% 3% 4% 5% 55     16     24     30     
Insurers 0.00 8% 6% 9% 6% 48     40     55     36     
All 0.08
Hedge Funds 0.23 10% 13% 5% 13% 57     82     31     83     
Brokers 0.23 12% 17% 9% 12% 78     102     55     73     
Banks 0.02 23% 12% 10% 9% 142     74     58     54     
Insurers 0.12 13% 16% 12% 16% 84     102     73     96     
1244
January 1999 to December 2001
6% 611




January 1996 to December 1998







January 1994 to December 1996
6%
# of Connections as % of All Possible 
Connections
9%
Table 5: Summary statistics of linear Granger-causality relationships (at the 5% level of
statistical signiﬁcance) among the monthly returns of the largest 25 banks, brokers, insur-
ers, and hedge funds (as determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market
capitalization for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered) for ﬁve
sample periods: January 1994 to December 1996, January 1996 to December 1998, January
1999 to December 2001, January 2002 to December 2004, and January 2006 to December
2008. Asset-weighted autocorrelations, the normalized number of connections, and the total
number of connections for all ﬁnancial institutions, hedge funds, brokers, banks, and in-
surers are calculated for each sample, and all p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity.
26Figure 7: Network Diagram of Linear Granger-causality relationships that are statistically
signiﬁcant at 5% level among the monthly returns of the 25 largest (in terms of average AUM)
banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds over January 1994 to December 1996. The type
of institution causing the relationship is indicated by color: green for brokers, red for hedge
funds, black for insurers, and blue for banks. All p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity.
27connections) in 2006–2008, which was right before and during the recent Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009 according to Table 5. Both the LTCM 1998 crisis and the Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009 were associated with liquidity and credit problems. The increase in intercon-
nections between ﬁnancial institutions is a signiﬁcant systemic risk indicator, especially for
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 which experienced the largest number of interconnections
compared to other time-periods.12
Figure 8: Network diagram of linear Granger-causality relationships that are statistically
signiﬁcant at 5% level among the monthly returns of the 25 largest (in terms of average
AUM) banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds over January 1996 to December 1998.
The type of institution causing the relationship is indicated by color: green for brokers,
red for hedge funds, black for insurers, and blue for banks. All p-values are adjusted for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
By measuring Granger-causal connections among individual ﬁnancial institutions, we see
that during the LTCM 1998 crisis (1996–1998 period), hedge funds were greatly intercon-
nected with other hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurers. Their impact on other ﬁnancial
institutions was substantial, though less than the total impact of other ﬁnancial institutions
on them. In the aftermath of the crisis (1999–2001 and 2002–2004 time periods), the number
of ﬁnancial connections decreased, especially links aﬀecting hedge funds. The total number
of connections clearly started to increase just before and in the beginning of the recent
12The results are similar when we adjust for the S&P 500, and are available upon request.
28Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (2006–2008 time period). In that time period, hedge funds
had signiﬁcant bi-lateral relationships with insurers and brokers. Hedge funds were highly
aﬀected by banks (23% of total possible connections), though they did not reciprocate in
aﬀecting the banks (5% of total possible connections). The number of signiﬁcant Granger-
causal relations from banks to hedge funds, 142, was the highest between these two sectors
across all ﬁve sample periods. In comparison, hedge funds Granger-caused only 31 banks.
These results for the largest individual ﬁnancial institutions are consistent with our index
results, suggesting that banks may be of more concern than the “shadow banking system”
from the perspective of systemic risk.
Figure 9: Network diagram of linear Granger-causality relationships that are statistically
signiﬁcant at 5% level among the monthly returns of the 25 largest (in terms of average
AUM) banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds over January 1999 to December 2001.
The type of institution causing the relationship is indicated by color: green for brokers,
red for hedge funds, black for insurers, and blue for banks. All p-values are adjusted for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
Lo (2002) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) suggest using return autocorrela-
tions to gauge the illiquidity risk exposure, hence we report asset-weighted autocorrelations
in Table 5. We ﬁnd that the asset-weighted autocorrelations for all ﬁnancial institutions
were negative for the ﬁrst four time periods, however, in 2006–2008, the period that in-
cludes the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the autocorrelation becomes positive. When we separate
29the asset-weighted autocorrelations by sector, we ﬁnd that during all periods, hedge-fund
asset-weighted autocorrelations were positive, but were mostly negative for all other ﬁnancial
institutions.13 However, in the last sample period (2006–2008), the asset-weighted autocor-
relations became positive for all ﬁnancial institutions. These results suggest that the period
of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 exhibited the most illiquidity and connectivity among
ﬁnancial institutions.
In summary, we ﬁnd that, on average, all companies in the four sectors we studied have
become highly interrelated and generally less liquid over the past decade, increasing the level
of systemic risk in the ﬁnance and insurance industries.
Figure 10: Network diagram of linear Granger-causality relationships that are statistically
signiﬁcant at 5% level among the monthly returns of the 25 largest (in terms of average AUM)
banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds over January 2002 to December 2004. The type
of institution causing the relationship is indicated by color: green for brokers, red for hedge
funds, black for insurers, and blue for banks. All p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity.
To separate contagion and common-factor exposure, we regress each company’s monthly
returns on the S&P 500 and re-run the linear Granger causality tests on the residuals. We
13Starting in the October 2002–September 2005 period, the overall system and individual ﬁnancial-
institution 36-month rolling-window autocorrelations became positive and remained positive through the
end of the sample.
30Figure 11: Network diagram of linear Granger-causality relationships that are statistically
signiﬁcant at 5% level among the monthly returns of the 25 largest (in terms of average AUM)
banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds over January 2006 to December 2008. The type
of institution causing the relationship is indicated by color: green for brokers, red for hedge
funds, black for insurers, and blue for banks. All p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity.
31ﬁnd the same pattern of dynamic interconnectedness between ﬁnancial institutions, and the
resulting network diagrams are qualitatively similar to those with raw returns, hence we
omit them to conserve space.14
5.4 Early Warning Signals of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009
One natural application of any systemic risk measure is to provide an actionable early warn-
ing signal. In this section, we construct an array of such indicators based on the Granger-
causality networks of Section 5.3 and principal components analysis of Section 5.1, and
apply it to speciﬁc ﬁnancial institutions. Following the approach of Acharya et al. (2010),
we consider two 36-month samples, October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007,
as estimation periods in which systemic risk measures are estimated, and the period from
July 2007–December 2008 as the “out-of-sample” period encompassing the Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009. The October 2002–September 2005 period is chosen because this is the last
36-month rolling sub-period before the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 in which the number
of connections was statistically diﬀerent from zero, and the overall system and individual
ﬁnancial-institution autocorrelations became and stayed positive before the Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009. July 2004–June 2007 is considered because this is the last 36-month sub-
period before the recent crisis. For each ﬁnancial institution, we compute the following set
of systemic risk measures (the ﬁrst eight are based on Granger-causality network diagrams
and the last one is based on principal components analysis):
• Number of “In” Connections: The number of ﬁnancial institutions that signiﬁ-
cantly Granger-cause this ﬁnancial institution.
• Number of “Out” Connections: The number of ﬁnancial institutions that are
signiﬁcantly Granger-caused by this ﬁnancial institution.
• Number of “In+Out” Connections: The sum of “In” and “Out” connections.
• Number of “In-from-Other” Connections: The number of other types of ﬁnancial
institutions that signiﬁcantly Granger-cause this ﬁnancial institution. For example, for
a hedge fund, “other types” are banks, brokers, and insurers.
14Network diagrams for residual returns (from a market-model regression against the S&P 500) are avail-
able upon request.
32• Number of “Out-to-Other” Connections: The number of other types of ﬁnancial
institutions that are signiﬁcantly Granger-caused by this ﬁnancial institution.
• Number of “In+Out Other” Connections: The sum of “In-from-Other” and
“Out-to-Other” connections.
• Closeness: The shortest path between a ﬁnancial institution and all other ﬁnancial
institutions reachable from it, averaged across all other ﬁnancial institutions.
• Eigenvector Centrality: A measure of the importance of a ﬁnancial institution in a
network, which assigns relative scores to ﬁnancial institutions in the network based on
the principle that connections to high-scoring ﬁnancial institutions contribute more to
the score of the ﬁnancial institution in question than equal connections to low-scoring
ﬁnancial institutions.15
• PCA: The total absolute exposure of a ﬁnancial institution to the ﬁrst 20 principal
components weighted by the percentage of the variance explained by each principal
component.
As in Section 5.3, for each of the four categories we consider the top 25 ﬁnancial institu-
tions as determined by the average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization
for brokers, insurers, and banks during the time period considered, yielding 100 entities in
all. For each systemic risk measure, ﬁnancial institutions are ranked from 1 to 100.
To evaluate the predictive power of these rankings, we ﬁrst compute the maximum per-
centage ﬁnancial loss (Max%Loss) suﬀered by each of the 100 institutions during the crisis
period from July 2007 to December 2008.16 We then rank all ﬁnancial institutions from
1 to 100 according to Max%Loss. We then estimate univariate regressions for Max%Loss
rankings on the institutions’ systemic-risk rankings. The results are reported in Table 6 for
two samples: October 2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. For each regression,
15Speciﬁcally, for a network with n nodes, let A be the “adjacency matrix”, the (n×n)-matrix of 0’s and
1’s in which the (i,j)-th element is 1 if there is a connection between nodes i and j, and 0 otherwise. The
eigenvector centrality measure is the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of A. See Newman
(2010) for details.
16The maximum percentage loss for a ﬁnancial institution is deﬁned to be the diﬀerence between the
market capitalization of the institution (fund size in the case of hedge funds) at the end of June 2007 and the
minimum market capitalization during the period from July 2007 to December 2008 divided by the market
capitalization or fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007.
33we report the β coeﬃcient, the t-statistic, p-value, and the Kendall (1938) τ rank-correlation
coeﬃcient.
Coeff t-stat p-value Kendall τ Coeff t-stat p-value Kendall τ
# of "In" Connections 0.03 0.25 0.80 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.94 -0.01
# of "Out" Connections 0.23 2.23 0.03 0.16 0.25 2.53 0.01 0.20
# of "In+Out" Connections 0.16 1.51 0.13 0.11 0.19 1.89 0.06 0.13
# of "In-from-Other" Connections 0.12 1.15 0.25 0.09 -0.02 -0.19 0.85 -0.02
# of "Out-to-Other" Connections 0.32 3.11 0.00 0.22 0.17 1.68 0.10 0.13
# of "In+Out Other" Connections 0.23 2.23 0.03 0.15 0.09 0.84 0.41 0.06
Closeness 0.23 2.23 0.03 0.16 0.25 2.53 0.01 0.20
Eigenvector Centrality 0.24 2.31 0.02 0.16 0.24 2.44 0.02 0.17
PCA 0.32 3.11 0.00 0.24 0.16 1.51 0.13 0.12
Max % Loss (2005) Max % Loss (2007)
Statistic
Table 6: Regression coeﬃcients, t-statistics, p-values, and Kendall τ rank-correlation coeﬃ-
cients for regressions of maximum percentage loss on systemic risk measures. The maximum
percentage loss for a ﬁnancial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative
decline in market capitalization or fund size for each ﬁnancial institution during July 2007–
December 2008 divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at
the end of June 2007. Systemic risk measures are calculated over two samples: October
2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. Statistics that are signiﬁcant at 5% level
are displayed in bold.
We ﬁnd that Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out Other, Closeness, Eigenvector Centrality, and
PCA are signiﬁcant determinants of the Max%Loss variable.17 Based on the Closeness and
Eigenvector Centrality measures, ﬁnancial institutions that are systemically important and
are very interconnected are the ones that suﬀered the most during the Financial Crisis of
2007–2009. However, the institutions that declined the most during the Crisis were the
ones that greatly aﬀected other institutions—both their own and other types—and not the
institutions that were aﬀected by others. Both Out and Out-to-Other are signiﬁcant, whereas
In and In-from-Other are not. The top names in the Out and Out-to-Other categories include
Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citigroup, Federal National Mortgage Association, UBS,
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Wachovia, Bank New York, American International Group, and
Washington Mutual.18 In addition to causal relationships, contemporaneous correlations
17We have also analyzed the maximum ﬁnancial loss in dollar terms (MaxLoss) for each of the 100 institu-
tions from July 2007 to December 2008, which is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the market capitalization
of the institution (or fund size in the case of hedge funds) at the end of June 2007 and the minimum market
capitalization during the period from July 2007 to December 2008. For MaxLoss, Out-to-Other and Eigen-
vector Centrality are signiﬁcant at 5% level and Out, In+Out Other, Closeness, and PCA are signiﬁcant at
10%.
18The top 20 ranked ﬁnancial institutions with respect to the Out-to-Other systemic risk measure are
listed in Table 8.
34between ﬁnancial institutions served as predictors of the crisis. Based on the signiﬁcance of
the PCA measure, companies that were more correlated and associated with other companies,
were more likely to suﬀer signiﬁcant losses during the recent crisis.19
Consistent with the empirical results of Sections 5.1–5.3, banks, brokers, and insurance
companies are systemically more important than hedge funds. As early as 2002–2005, impor-
tant connections among these ﬁnancial institutions were established that later contributed
to the Financial Crisis and the subsequent decline of many of them.20
6 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we check the robustness of our main results. In Section 6.1, we test the
signiﬁcance of our Granger-causality results. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we consider leverage
and liquidity eﬀects, respectively. Finally, in Section 6.4, we consider whether our systemic
risk measures can predict future losses among individual ﬁnancial institutions.
6.1 Signiﬁcance of Granger-Causal Relationships
In this section we check for the possibility that Granger-causal relationships observed in
the sample are due to chance. We ﬁrst re-examine our results in Section 5.2 by conducting
those inferences at the 1% level, and the results are depicted in Figure 4. Even at the 1%
level, when the 1998, 2003–2005, and 2007–2008 periods are considered, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
causal relationships between the indexes of Banks, Hedge Funds, Insurers, and Brokers.
In particular, at the 1% signiﬁcance level, in 2005–2008, the period before and during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis, we observe 25% signiﬁcant connections among indexes of ﬁnancial and
insurance institutions.
To test whether Granger-causal relationships between individual ﬁnancial and insurance
institutions are due to chance, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation analysis. Speciﬁcally,
assuming independence among ﬁnancial institutions, we randomly simulate 100 time series
representing the 100 ﬁnancial institutions’ returns in our sample, and test for Granger causal-
ity at the 5% level among all possible causal relationships (as in the empirical analysis in
19The signiﬁcance of the PCA measure decreased in July 2004–June 2007. This is consistent with the
result in Figure 1 where, for the monthly return indexes, the ﬁrst principal component captured less of
return variation during this time period than in the October 2002–September 2005 period.
20We also consider time periods after October 2002–September 2005, and the results are still signiﬁcant
for Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out Other, Closeness, Eigenvector Centrality, and PCA measures.
35Section 5.3, there are a total of 9,900 possible causal relationships), and record the number
of signiﬁcant connections. We repeat this exercise 500 times, and the resulting distribution
is given in Figure 12. This distribution is centered at 0.052, which represents the fraction of
signiﬁcant connections among all possible connections under the null hypothesis of no sta-
tistical relation among any of the ﬁnancial institutions. The area between 0.049 and 0.055
captures 90% of the simulations. Therefore, if we observe more than 5.5% of signiﬁcant
relationships in the real data, our results are unlikely to be the result of type I error.
We also conduct a similar simulation under the null hypothesis of contemporaneously
correlated returns due to the S&P 500, but no causal relations among ﬁnancial institutions
(see the Appendix for details). The results are essentially the same, as seen in the histogram
in Figure 12: the histogram is centered around 0.052, and the area between 0.048 and 0.055
captures 90% of the simulations.
In Figure 6 we graph the total number of connections as a percentage of all possible
connections we observe in the real data at the 5% signiﬁcance level (in black) against 0.055,
the 95th percentile of the simulated distribution obtained under the hypothesis of no causal
relationships (in red). We see that when the 1998–1999, 2002–2004, and 2007-2008 periods
are included in the analysis, the number of causal relationships observed far exceeds the
number obtained purely by chance. Therefore, for these time-periods we can aﬃrm that the
observed causal relationships are statistically signiﬁcant.21
6.2 Leverage Eﬀects
In this section, we consider whether some of our results can be explained by accounting
for leverage eﬀects.22 Leverage has the eﬀect of a magnifying glass, expanding small proﬁt
opportunities into larger ones, but also expanding small losses into larger losses. And when
unexpected adverse market conditions reduce the value of the corresponding collateral, such
events often trigger forced liquidations of large positions over short periods of time. Such
eﬀorts to reduce leverage can lead to systemic events as we have witnessed during the recent
crisis. Since leverage information is not directly available, for publicly traded banks, brokers,
and insurers, we estimate their leverage as the ratio of Total Assets minus Equity Market
Value to Equity Market Value. For hedge funds, we use reported average leverage for a given
21The results are similar for the 1%-level of signiﬁcance.












































































































































































































Figure 12: Histograms of simulated Granger-causal relationships between ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. 100 time series representing 100 ﬁnancial institutions’s returns are simulated and
tested for Granger casuality at the 5% level. The number of signiﬁcant connections out of all
possible connections is calculated for 500 simulations. In histogram (a), independence among
ﬁnancial institutions is assumed. In histogram (b), contemporaneous correlation among ﬁ-
nancial institutions, captured through the dependence on the S&P 500 is allowed. See the
Appendix for a more detailed description of the simulation.
37time period. Using these crude proxies, we ﬁnd that estimated leverage is positively related
to future losses (Max%Loss).23
We also estimated a multivariate regression in which we regressed Max%Loss for each
ﬁnancial institution during July 2007–December 2008 on PCA, Leverage, and systemic risk
measures based on Granger causality (for each Granger-causality measure, we estimated a
separate regression). The results are presented in Table 7. We ﬁnd that Leverage and PCA
are signiﬁcant in all these regressions.24 After adjusting for PCA and Leverage, we ﬁnd
that Out, In+Out, Out-to-Other, In+Out Other, Closeness, and Eigenvector Centrality are
signiﬁcant determinants of Max%Loss.25 This is consistent with our main results. More
importantly, we ﬁnd that all our systemic risk measures are important, and capture diﬀer-
ent aspects of systemic risk. For example, both systemic risk measures based on Granger
causality and principal components analysis served as early warning signals for the Financial
Crisis of 2007–2009.
6.3 Liquidity Eﬀects
Leverage is problematic largely because of illiquidity—in the event of a margin call on a lever-
aged portfolio, forced liquidations may cause even larger losses and additional margin calls,
ultimately leading to a series of insolvencies and defaults as ﬁnancial institutions withdraw
credit. Lo (2002) and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) suggest using return autocorrela-
tion to gauge the illiquidity risk exposure of a given ﬁnancial institution, hence we re-estimate
the multivariate regression of Table 7 with the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of monthly returns
as an additional regressor. All the patterns and inferences from Table 7 remain the same,
even after controlling for leverage and liquidity eﬀects as captured through autocorrelation.
As shown in Table 5, the return autocorrelation of most ﬁnancial institutions increased over
time, and this trend may explain why the eﬀects of liquidity/autocorrelation on future losses
became signiﬁcant in the July 2004–June 2007 period, serving as another warning signal for
23When leverage is calculated over the October 2002–September 2005 time period and regressed on
Max%Loss over the July 2007–December 2008 period, we obtain a slope coeﬃcient of 0.22, a p-value of
0.04, and a τ rank-correlation coeﬃcient of 0.16. The results are similar when the July 2004–June 2007
period is considered.
24The correlation between leverage and our systemic risk measures is small and often negative, and in
most cases, not statistically signiﬁcant. Results are available upon request.
25We also adjusted for asset size (as determined by AUM for hedge funds and market capitalization for
brokers, insurers, and banks) and the results are not altered by including this additional regressor. In all
regressions, asset size is not signiﬁcant for Max%Loss. This may be due to the fact that our analysis is
concentrated on large ﬁnancial institutions (the top 25 for each sector). Results are available upon request.
38Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept 16.33 2.08 7.59 1.00 8.83 1.13 16.19 2.17 6.86 0.94 10.40 1.38 7.59 1.00 8.97 1.18
Leverage 0.23 2.26 0.25 2.59 0.25 2.54 0.23 2.22 0.28 2.87 0.25 2.52 0.25 2.59 0.25 2.54
PCA 0.33 3.17 0.29 2.93 0.31 3.11 0.31 2.97 0.22 2.15 0.27 2.67 0.29 2.93 0.29 2.89
# of "In" Connections 0.06 0.57
# of "Out" Connections 0.28 2.77
# of "In+Out" Connections 0.23 2.26
# of "In-from-Other" Connections 0.08 0.76
# of "Out-to-Other" Connections 0.34 3.26
# of "In+Out Other" Connections 0.23 2.21
Closeness 0.28 2.77
Eigenvector Centrality 0.25 2.44
R-square 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.22
Intercept 28.84 3.00 15.56 1.75 15.55 1.63 30.13 3.15 18.38 1.98 22.01 2.21 15.56 1.75 16.69 1.89
Leverage 0.18 1.72 0.23 2.25 0.21 2.10 0.18 1.72 0.22 2.13 0.20 1.91 0.23 2.25 0.20 2.03
PCA 0.17 1.59 0.16 1.57 0.21 2.02 0.16 1.55 0.17 1.65 0.19 1.82 0.16 1.57 0.17 1.71
# of "In" Connections 0.03 0.30
# of "Out" Connections 0.28 2.80
# of "In+Out" Connections 0.25 2.40
# of "In-from-Other" Connections 0.01 0.09
# of "Out-to-Other" Connections 0.22 2.11
# of "In+Out Other" Connections 0.14 1.30
Closeness 0.28 2.80
Eigenvector Centrality 0.27 2.69
R-square 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.13
October 2002 to September 2005
July 2004 to June 2007
Table 7: Parameter estimates of a multivariate regression of Max%Loss for each ﬁnancial
institution during July 2007–December 2008 on PCA, Leverage, and systemic risk measures
based on Granger causality. The maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for a ﬁnancial
institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative decline in market capitalization
or fund size for each ﬁnancial institution during July 2007–December 2008 divided by the
market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at the end of June 2007. PCA,
Leverage, and systemic risk measures based on Granger causality are calculated over October
2002–September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007. Parameter estimates that are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level are shown in bold.
39the recent ﬁnancial crisis.26
These robustness checks lead us to conclude that, in both sample periods (October 2002–
September 2005 and July 2004–June 2007 periods), our results are robust—systemic risk
measures based on Granger causality and principal components analysis seem to be early
warning signals for the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.
6.4 Individual Financial Institutions
One ﬁnal robustness check of our systemic risk measures is to explore their implications for
individual ﬁnancial institutions. In this section we provide a simple comparison between the
rankings of individual institutions according to our measures of systemic risk with the rank-
ings based on subsequent ﬁnancial losses. Consider ﬁrst the Out-to-Others Granger-causality
network measure, estimated over the October 2002–September 2005 sample period. We rank
all ﬁnancial institutions based on this measure, and the 20 highest-scoring institutions are
presented in Table 8, along with the 20 highest-scoring institutions based on the maximum
percentage loss (Max%Loss) during the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008.27
We ﬁnd an overlap of 7 ﬁnancial institutions between these two rankings.
In Table 7 we showed that in addition to Out-to-Other, Leverage and PCA were also
signiﬁcant in predicting Max%Loss. Therefore, it is possible to sharpen our prediction
by ranking ﬁnancial institutions according to a simple aggregation of all three measures.
To that end, we multiply each institution’s ranking according to Out-to-Other, Leverage,
and PCA by their corresponding beta coeﬃcients from Table 7, sum these products, and
then re-rank all ﬁnancial institutions based on this aggregate sum. The 20 highest-scoring
institutions according to this aggregate measure, estimated using date from October 2002–
September 2005, are presented in Table 8. In this case we ﬁnd an overlap of 12 ﬁnancial
institutions (among the top 20) and most of the rest (among the top 30) with ﬁnancial
institutions ranked on Max%Loss. This improvement in correspondence and reduction in
“false positives” suggest that our aggregate ranking may be useful in identifying systemically
important entities.
26We omit these results to conserve space, but they are available from the authors upon request.
27The ﬁrst 11 ﬁnancial institutions in Max%Loss ranking were bankrupt, therefore, representing the same
Max%Loss equalled to 100%.
40Out-to-Other Aggregate Measure Max Percentage Loss
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW DEUTSCHE BANK AG Perry Partners LP
PROGRESSIVE CORP OH U B S AG EDWARDS A G INC
BANK OF AMERICA CORP FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN Canyon Value Realization (Cayman) Ltd (A)
STEWART W P & CO LTD Tomasetti Investment LP C I T GROUP INC NEW
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC Tomasetti Investment LP
INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GP INC NEW C I G N A CORP BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC
CITIGROUP INC JEFFERIES GROUP INC NEW ACE LTD
U B S AG CITIGROUP INC LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GP INC NEW WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP IN Kingate Global Ltd USD Shares
AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP
Kingate Global Ltd USD Shares BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN
T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC ACE LTD RADIAN GROUP INC
JEFFERIES GROUP INC NEW C I T GROUP INC NEW AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC
X L CAPITAL LTD WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC
M B N A CORP RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC STEWART W P & CO LTD
M B I A INC BANK OF AMERICA CORP M G I C INVESTMENT CORP WIS
Graham Global Investment K4D-10 STEWART W P & CO LTD WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC PROGRESSIVE CORP OH HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP IN
ACE LTD HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP IN X L CAPITAL LTD
Table 8: Granger-causality-network-based measures of systemic risk for a sample of 100
ﬁnancial institutions consisting of the 25 largest banks, brokers, insurers, and hedge funds (as
determined by average AUM for hedge funds and average market capitalization for brokers,
insurers, and banks during the time period considered) for the sample period from October
2002 to September 2005. Only the 20 highest-scoring institutions based on Out-to-Other
and aggregate measures are displayed. The aggregate measure is an aggregation of the
Out-to-Other, Leverage and PCA measures. The maximum percentage loss (Max%Loss) for
a ﬁnancial institution is the dollar amount of the maximum cumulative decline in market
capitalization or fund size for each ﬁnancial institution during July 2007–December 2008
divided by the market capitalization or total fund size of the institution at the end of June
2007. All connections are based on Granger-causal statistics at the 5% level of statistical
signiﬁcance.
417 Conclusion
The ﬁnancial system has become considerably more complex over the past two decades
as distinctions between hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, and bro-
ker/dealers have blurred, thanks to ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation. While such
changes are inevitable consequences of prosperity and economic growth, they are accom-
panied by certain consequences, including the build-up of systemic risk.
In this paper, we propose to measure systemic risk indirectly via econometric techniques
such as principal components analysis and Granger-causality tests. These measures seem to
capture unique and diﬀerent facets of systemic risk. Principal components analysis provides
a broad view of connections among all four groups of ﬁnancial institutions, and Granger-
causality networks capture the intricate web of statistical relations among individual ﬁrms
in the ﬁnance and insurance industries.
The sheer complexity of the global ﬁnancial system calls for a multidimensional approach
to systemic risk measurement. For example, in a recent simulation study of the U.S. residen-
tial housing market, Khandani, Lo, and Merton (2009) show that systemic events can arise
from the simultaneous occurrence of three trends: rising home prices, falling interest rates,
and increasing eﬃciency and availability of reﬁnancing opportunities. Individually, each of
these trends is benign, and often considered harbingers of economic growth. But when they
occur at the same time, they inadvertently cause homeowners to synchronize their equity
withdrawals via reﬁnancing, ratcheting up homeowner leverage simultaneously without any
means for reducing leverage when home prices eventually fall, ultimately leading to waves
of correlated defaults and foreclosures. While excessive risk-taking, overly aggressive lend-
ing practices, pro-cyclical regulations, and government policies may have contributed to the
recent problems in the U.S. housing market, this study shows that even if all homeowners,
lenders, investors, insurers, rating agencies, regulators, and policymakers behaved rationally,
ethically, and with the purest of intentions, ﬁnancial crises can still occur.
Using monthly returns data for hedge-fund indexes and portfolios of publicly traded
banks, insurers, and brokers, we show that such indirect measures are indeed capable of
picking up periods of market dislocation and distress, and may be used as early warning
signals to identify systemically important institutions. Moreover, over the recent sample
period, our empirical results suggest that the banking and insurance sectors may be even
42more important sources of systemic risk than other parts, which is consistent with the anec-
dotal evidence from the current ﬁnancial crisis. The illiquidity of bank and insurance assets,
coupled with fact that banks and insurers are not designed to withstand rapid and large
losses (unlike hedge funds), make these sectors a natural repository for systemic risk.
The same feedback eﬀects and dynamics apply to bank and insurance capital requirements
and risk management practices based on VaR, which are intended to ensure the soundness
of individual ﬁnancial institutions, but may amplify aggregate ﬂuctuations if they are widely
adopted. For example, if the riskiness of assets held by one bank increases due to heightened
market volatility, to meet its VaR requirements the bank will have to sell some of these risky
assets. This liquidation may restore the bank’s ﬁnancial soundness, but if all banks engage
in such liquidations at the same time, a devastating positive feedback loop may be generated
unintentionally. These endogenous feedback eﬀects can have signiﬁcant implications for the
returns of ﬁnancial institutions, including autocorrelation, increased correlation, changes in
volatility, Granger causality, and, ultimately, increased systemic risk, as our empirical results
seem to imply.
As long as human behavior is coupled with free enterprise, it is unrealistic to expect that
market crashes, manias, panics, collapses, and fraud will ever be completely eliminated from
our capital markets. The best hope for avoiding some of the most disruptive consequences
of such crises is to develop methods for measuring, monitoring, and anticipating them. By
using a broad array of tools for gauging systemic exposures, we stand a better chance of
identifying “black swans” when they are still cygnets.
43A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide the technical details of the linear and nonlinear Granger-
causality tests in Sections A.1 and A.2, respectively. Monte carlo simulations for determining
the statistical signiﬁcance of Granger-causality network measures are described in Section
A.3.
A.1 Linear Granger Causality
Let Xt and Yt be two stationary time series and for simplicity assume that they have zero
















where ￿t and ηt are two uncorrelated white noise processes, m is the maximum lag considered,
and aj,bj,cj,dj are coeﬃcients of the model.
The deﬁnition of causality implies that Y causes X when bj is diﬀerent from zero. Likewise
X causes Y when cj is diﬀerent from zero. When both of these statements are true, there is
a feedback relationship between the time series. The model selection criteria of the number
of lags considered for the test is based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (see Schwarz,
1978). The causality is based on the F-test of the null hypothesis that coeﬃcients bj or cj
are equal to zero according to the direction of the Granger causality.
A.2 Nonlinear Granger Causality
Let us assume that Yt = (St,Zt) is a ﬁrst-order Markov process (or Markov chain) with
transition probabilities:
P(Yt|Yt−1,...,Y0) = P(Yt|Yt−1) = P(St,Zt|St−1,Zt−1).
Then, all the information from the past history of the process, which is relevant for the
transition probabilities in time t, is represented by the previous state of the process, i.e.
the state in time (t − 1). Under the additional assumption that transition probabilities
do not vary over time, the process is deﬁned as a Markov chain with stationary transition
probabilities, summarized in the transition matrix Π.
We can further decompose the joint transition probabilities as follows:
Π = P(Yt|Yt−1) = P(St,Zt|St−1,Zt−1) = P(St|Zt,St−1,Zt−1) × P(Zt|St−1,Zt−1). (A.2)
and thus deﬁne the Granger non-causality for a Markov chain as:
44Deﬁnition 1 Strong one-step ahead non-causality for a Markov chain with stationary tran-
sition probabilities, i.e. Zt−1 does not strongly cause St given St−1 if:
P(St|St−1,Zt−1) = P(St|St−1) ∀t.
Similarly, St−1 does not strongly cause Zt given Zt−1 if:
P(Zt|Zt−1,St−1) = P(Zt|Zt−1) ∀t.
The Granger non-causality tests in this framework are based on the transition matrix Π that
can be represented through the parametrization introduced by Billio and Di Sanzo (2006).
The authors show that the transition matrix Π can be represented with a logistic function.
More speciﬁcally, when we consider two-state Markov chains, the joint probability of St and
Zt can be represented as follows:






















where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Ut is an invertible linear transformation of:
U
?
t = [(1 − St−1)(1 − Zt−1),St−1 (1 − Zt−1),(1 − St−1)Zt−1,St−1Zt−1]
0 ,
that represents the four mutually exclusive dummies representing the four states of the
process at time t−1, i.e., [00, 10, 01, 11]0. Given this parametrization, the conditions for
strong one-step ahead non-causality are easily determined as restrictions on the parameter
space.
To impose the Granger non-causality (as in Deﬁnition 1), it is necessary that the de-
pendence on St−1 disappears in the second term of the decomposition. Thus, it is simply
required that the parameters of the terms of Ut depending on St−1 are equal to zero:
HS;Z (S ; Z) : β2 = β4 = 0 .
45Under HS;Z, St−1 does not strongly cause one-step ahead Zt given Zt−1. The terms St−1
and St−1Zt−1 are excluded from Ut, hence P(Zt|St−1,Zt−1) = P(Zt|Zt−1).
Both hypotheses can be tested in a bivariate regime-switching model using a Wald test
or a Likelihood ratio test. In the empirical analysis, bivariate regime-switching models have
been estimated by maximum likelihood using the Hamilton’s ﬁlter (Hamilton (1994)) and in
all our estimations we compute the robust covariance matrix estimators (often known as the
sandwich estimator) to calculate the standard errors (see Huber (1981) and White (1982)).
A.3 Monte Carlo Simulation Experiments
To test our procedure in identifying Granger-causal linkages, we perform a simple Monte
Carlo simulation experiment. Because we wish to retain the contemporaneous dependence
structure among the individual time series, our working hypothesis is that the dependence
arises from a common factor, i.e., the S&P 500. Speciﬁcally, to simulate 100 time series
(one for each ﬁnancial institution), we start with the time-series data for these institutions
and ﬁlter out heteroskedastic eﬀects with a GARCH(1,1) process, as in the linear Granger-
causality analysis of Section 5.2. Then we regress the residuals on the returns of the S&P
500 index:
yi = αi + βiS&P500 + σi￿i , i = 1,...,100 , ￿i IID N(0,1)
and store the parameter estimates ˆ αi, ˆ βi, and ˆ σi, to be used to calibrate our simulation’s data-
generating process, where “IID” denotes independently and identically distributed random
variables.
Next, we simulate 36 monthly returns (corresponding to the 3-year period in our sample)
of the common factor and the residual returns of the 100 hypothetical ﬁnancial institutions.
Returns of the common factor come from a normal random variable with mean and standard
deviation set equal to that of the S&P 500. The residuals ￿ij are IID standard normal random




ji = ˆ αi + ˆ βiS&P500
S
j + ˆ σi￿
S
ji , i = 1,...,100 , j = 1,...,500. (A.4)
For each j, we perform our Granger-causality analysis and calculate the number of signiﬁcant
connections, and compute the empirical distribution of the various test statistics which can
then be used to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of our empirical ﬁndings.
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